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Foreign
Epilog:
Symposium
Sovereign Immunity at Home and
Abroad
Ingrid Wuerth*
Orhan Pamuk, in one of his early novels, describes a Turkish
mannequin maker from the mid-twentieth century. The artisan crafts
expressive, individual figures with distinctive faces and hand
gestures. Unfortunately, however, there is no demand for his
mannequins. The large department stores fashionable in Istanbul
favored foreign-looking human forms, lacking Turkish features, with
identical, fake smiles. The hundreds of life-like Turkish mannequins
that he continues to make are crowded, gesturing to each other, in his
dank basement that leads to an intricate set of underground
passageways beneath Istanbul.'
For Pamuk, mannequins obviously serve as a metaphor for
national and personal identity, but we can also use this metaphor for
foreign state immunity. If the international law of immunity once
purported to make foreign states, their rulers, their officials, and
their boats all identical in some sense-the sovereign equality of
states-today immunity distinguishes and differentiates between the
state's commercial and private features, its tortious and non-tortious
conduct committed in the forum state, and sometimes even the
torture, war crimes, and acts of terrorism carried out in its name. Of
course, sovereign equality has diminished in general as human rights
have grown, but even as nation-states accept treaty-based obligations
toward their own citizens, they refuse to make themselves explicitly
accountable in the national courts of other countries and usually
refuse to hold other states accountable in their own courts. Immunity
often remains the stylized equalizer.
But there are exceptions. If we imagine those who claim
immunity as a party of mannequins, we would encounter the true-tolife forms of those who have been denied immunity wandering
amongst the many stylized, featureless, immunity-protected entities.
The individualized figures would include Augusto Pinochet, 2 up from
the dark basement of the national and personal psyche, along with
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the German government and its military officials with their acts of
brutality in Italy and Greece at the end of the Second World War. 3
We would find state-owned vessels engaged in commercial trading, 4
along with pin-striped Hugo Boss-clad representatives of state-owned
banks.5 Stripped of immunity, they are subjected to the possibility of
individual scrutiny in a foreign forum that threatens to lay bear the
specifics of their alleged human rights violations, commercial
duplicity, or contractual malfeasance. We would not meet Donald
Rumsfeld, 6 but depending on how we define things-and much
depends on this-we might meet Charles Taylor (no immunity before
a hybrid court)7 or Omar al Bashir (arguably no immunity before the
International Criminal Court).8
What would and should this grim, imagined gathering look like
five, twenty or fifty years from now? And who should decide? The
accomplished authors for this symposium issue consider these
questions in detail in the pages that follow.
The keynote address for the Vanderbilt conference was delivered
by the distinguished Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser of the U.S.
Department of State, the former Dean of Yale Law School, and a
leading scholar of international and foreign relations law. His
ground-breaking remarks focused on the U.S. government's approach
to foreign official immunity.9 The Supreme Court's 2010 decision in
Samantar v. Yousuflo held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act does not apply to claims against individual foreign officials and
that common law applies instead. Legal Adviser Koh provides the
reader with an invaluable discussion of the State Department's
understanding of the Samantar decision, and the process that the

3.
Cass., sez. un., 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044, Giust. Civ. 2004 II, 1191 (It.),
translated in Ferrini v. Germany, 128 I.L.R. 658 (2004) (upholding jurisdiction of
Italian civil courts over a claim by an individual deported to Germany during World
War II and forced to work in munitions factory); Protodikeia Polymele Livadia [Pol. Pr.
Liv.] [Three-Member District Court in Livadia] 137/1997 (Greece) (holding that state
immunity did not apply to actions jure gestionis and denying Germany's claim to
immunity for a massacre committed by its soldiers in 1944), affd, Areios Pagos [A.P.]
[Supreme Court] 11/2000 (Greece). The Supreme Court case is translated into English
and is available as Prefectureof Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, 129 I.L.R. 514
(2000).
4.
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels, Apr. 10, 1926, 179 L.N.T.S. 199.
5.
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 483 (1983) (denying
immunity in a suit against the Central Bank of Nigeria).
See Katherine Gallagher, Universal Jurisdiction in Practice, 7 J. INT'L
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CRIM. JUST. 1087, 1110 (2009).
Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I (30314-3039),
7.
Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 38 (Spec. Ct. Sierra Leone May 31, 2004).
8.
Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on InternationalCriminal Justice, 50 VA. J.
INT'L L. 269, 316 (2010).
Harold Hongju Koh, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar: A United
9.
States Government Perspective, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (forthcoming Nov. 2011).
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
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government is putting in place to consider official immunity issues as
they arise in the U.S. courts. He defends the role of the Executive
1
Branch in making individual immunity determinations' based on
the language of the Samantar opinion itself and on the Executive
Branch's expertise in a variety of areas, including international law,
the traditional principles of immunity recognized by the United
States, the human rights records of countries around the world, and
the diplomatic implications of particular immunity determinations.
Five tenets animate the State Department's approach to official
immunity going forward: (1) courts must defer to the State
Department on particular immunity issues; (2) the general principles
of immunity as articulated by the State Department govern in the
federal courts as a matter of federal common law; (3) official
immunities are for the protection of the foreign state not the
individual official; (4) conduct based immunities attach only to official
acts (generally not including conduct that violates both international
and domestic law); and (5) many cases involving foreign officials can
be resolved based on "non-Samantar" issues like status-based
immunities or procedural grounds.12 These important principles may
well provide the initial basis for a "Koh Letter," like the famous "Tate
Letter," that would formally articulate official immunity principles to
the benefit of litigants, courts, foreign states, and future
administrations.
Several other writers for this symposium also focus on immunity
determinations in the United States after Samantar. John Bellinger,
the former Legal Adviser of the State Department and now a partner
at Arnold & Porter, traces the position taken by the State
Department in the cases leading up to the Samantar decision and
outlines the burdens that the Department faces now that the Court
has adopted its position; in particular, the Department will be put
under political pressure from foreign states, will have to develop
positions on various kinds of individual official immunity (official act,
diplomatic and consular, head of state, and special missions
immunity), and may need to put a process in place to hear from
parties on both sides of immunity disputes.' 3 Professor Chimene
Keitner articulates several considerations that courts and the
Executive Branch should use to make determinations of conduct-

Koh, supra note 9, at 18-40. Contra Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official
11.
Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51
VA. J. INT'L L. 915 (2011) (arguing that federal common law, rather than executive
branch determinations, is the best source of law for immunity determinations).
Koh, supra note 9.
12.
John B. Bellinger III, The Dog that Caught the Car: Observations on the
13.
Past, Present, and FutureApproaches of the Office of the Legal Adviser to Official Acts
Immunities, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 825 (2011).

1236

VANDfRBILTJOURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 44:1233

based immunity,14 which generally presents more contested issues
than status-based immunity. Professor David Bederman develops the
argument that there are other pockets of potentially important
federal common law that are significant after FSIA, in particular the
actual possession rule in admiralty cases, which he argues continues
to apply today.1 5
Every author writing on U.S. law for this symposium notes that
the extent to which the Executive Branch can make binding
immunity determinations is an important issue going forward. In
addition to Legal Adviser Koh, two other authors address this issue
directly. Professor Peter Rutledge provides a typology of the various
roles that the Executive Branch might play in immunity (and other)
cases, distinguishing in particular between views articulated by the
Executive Branch independently of ongoing litigation, and those
expressed with respect to particular pending cases.1 6 And Lewis Yelin
of the Department of Justice has contributed a major, comprehensive
article defending the power of the Executive Branch to make binding
head of state (status-based) immunity determinations as a matter of
constitutional law. 17
Reading these articles together, one can see certain areas of
convergence (particularly in the area of status-based immunity), but
also areas of clear disagreement, particularly with respect to the
control the Executive can and should exert over immunity
determinations that arise in U.S. courts. In other words, the
composition of our imagined immunity party will depend in part on
the extent to which the views of the Executive Branch are followed,
how those views are formulated, the scope of conduct-based
immunity, and the existence of other potential areas of federal
common law in the immunity context.
A second grouping of authors focuses more generally on the
international law of immunity.' 8 Professor Roger O'Keefe argues that
there is no human rights exception to the immunity of states and that
indeed foreign states (which confer such immunity) are not really the
correct target for human rights advocates; instead more pressure
should be brought to bear on the states that actually commit the
violations and on the states of the victims' nationality that do not

14.
Chim~ne I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 843 (2011).
15.
David J. Bederman, The "Common Law Regime" of Foreign Sovereign
Immunity: The Actual Possession Rule in Admiralty, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 859
(2011).
Peter B. Rutledge, Samantar and Executive Power, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
16.
L. 891 (2011).
17.
Lewis S. Yelin, Head of State Immunity as Sole Executive Law Making, 44
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 917 (2011).
18.
HAZEL Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 20-25 (2d ed. 2008).
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adequately intercede with the responsible state.19 Professor Beth
Stephens argues that immunity itself is a dynamic doctrine that has
developed over time to reflect the needs of states. In light of the
dramatic changes in international law, which now make individuals
accountable for many serious human rights violations, states can no
longer use the immunity doctrines to protect their own officials from
such accountability.20 Professor David Stewart, a former member of
the State Department's legal team specializing in immunity and now
a professor at Georgetown, analyzes the history and current
significance of the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities
of States and Their Property. He argues that the Convention includes
no general human rights exception to state immunity, but should not
necessarily be seen as foreclosing a development of international law
in that direction. 2 '
The third group of authors considers national courts and the
development of international immunity law, with a focus on the
Germany v. Italy case which is currently pending before the
International Court of Justice. Professor Lori Damrosch examines
several questions fundamental to the role of national courts and
argues that customary international law does not "freeze" the law,
but instead that national courts are forging important exceptions to
immunity, as examples from both the United States and Italy
demonstrate.2 2 Consistent with some of the arguments advanced by
Professors Damrosch and Stephens, Professor Elena Sciso explores
the role of the Italian national courts in developing the international
law of immunity; these courts have accepted the argument that states
themselves are not entitled to immunity for certain egregious human
rights violations, especially violations of jus cogens norms.2 3 Offering
a cautionary note on jus cogens norms, Professor Paul Stephan argues
that they can act as a shield to protect the sovereign interests of
states, or they can act as sword to impose obligations on states
toward individuals, especially in the human rights context. The latter
function may work well if the world is comprised of liberal,
democratic nation states, but authoritarian regimes (like China) may
use them as shield, following in the footsteps of the former Soviet

Roger O'Keefe, State Immunity and Human Rights:. Heads and Walls,
19.
Hearts and Minds, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1005 (2011).
20.
Beth Stephens, Abusing the Authority of the State: Denying Foreign Official
Immunity for Egregious Human Rights Abuses, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
(forthcoming Nov. 2011).
David P. Stewart, The Immunity of State Officials Under the UN
21.
Convention on JurisdictionalImmunities of States and Their Property, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1051 (2011).
Lori Fisler Damrosch, Changing the International Law of Sovereign
22.
Immunity Through National Decisions, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (forthcoming Nov.
2011).
23.
Elena Sciso, Italian Judges' View on Foreign States' Immunity, 44 VAND. J.
TRANsNAT'L L. (forthcoming Nov. 2011).
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Union.24 Professor Christian Tomuschat counters directly the
argument that states lack immunity from suits based on jus cogens
violations. 25 His article also provides a detailed background of the
case brought by Germany against Italy before the International Court
of Justice, and argues that Italian national courts violated
international law by denying immunity to Germany for World War II
era war crimes that took place partly on Italian territory.
The optimal composition of our strange, imagined mannequin
party is deeply contested. Perhaps immunity is becoming obsolete for
individual officials who violate fundamental norms of international
law. And maybe the same holds for the immunity of states
themselves. If so, the stylized mannequins will pale beside the
individualized figures. But these developments are contested-as our
authors demonstrate-and the outcome may depend in part on where
such 'decisions are made: national courts, offices of the foreign
minister, or international tribunals. In Pamuk's novel, the
personalized mannequins remain in their moldy underground
labyrinth, reminders of national events and a national identity that
people prefer not to confront in their forward looking efforts to
become something new, different, and better as a nation.

24.
Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Jus Cogens, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1077 (2011).
25.
Christian Tomuschat, The International Law of State Immunity and Its
Development by National Institutions,44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1109 (2011).

